EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ramifications of Taiwan’s December 2001
Elections
for U.S.-PRC Relations
(4-5 February 2002)
The elections, which saw the upstart Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) replace the traditionally dominant Kuomintang (KMT) as the largest party in Taiwan’s legislature, marked another milestone in Taiwan’s democratization.
The
election results produced no dramatic, immediate consequences for Asia-Pacific
security, but they reveal the continuation of significant trends.
Taiwan’s
own identity is contested within Taiwan.
Taiwanese nationalism and cultural pride is asserting itself; the
question is how much room this leaves for a “Chinese” identity that associates
Taiwan with China.
“Taiwanization”/“localization” does not necessarily require formal
independence from China, but Taiwan politicians can make this linkage if they
so choose.
China
views the strengthened position of the DPP and President Chen Shui-bian as an
indication of further movement by Taiwan toward independence. This increases Chinese worries that Taiwan
is drifting away and that current Chinese policy is not bringing Beijing closer
to achieving its goals.
Beijing’s
policy toward Taiwan remains rigid and uncreative, despite the great
understanding of and appreciation for Taiwan politics demonstrated by many
Chinese analysts. In the absence of a
path-breaking new Chinese approach to the Taiwan problem, recent developments
favor Chinese elites who argue that building a military capability to subdue
Taiwan is the only way to prevent independence.
The
election results do not call for a change in basic U.S. policy toward
Taiwan. The American goal of peace in
the Taiwan Strait requires continued deterence of both PRC use of force and a Taiwan declaration of independence.
DPP
success is correlated to some degree with the strength of Taiwanese
nationalism. DPP gains might indicate
an increased risk that Taiwan will make formal political changes that would
provoke a military conflict with China.
Mitigating factors, however, are that (1) Chen Shui-bian has shown no
inclination to take the election results as a mandate to push further toward
independence; and (2) “politics are local,” and cross-Strait relations are not
the most important issue in Taiwan’s politics.
Keys to future developments:
(1) domestic politics; how will leaders channel assertive nationalism in China
and Taiwan and strong feelings in the USA toward China and Taiwan? (2) the
economic context; with recoveries in the U.S. and Taiwan economies and a weaker
PRC economy, cross-Strait tensions would probably have been greater than they
are now.