EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Religion & Security in South Asia
(19-22 August 2002)
Introduction
Religious
radicalism undoubtedly merits classification among the most serious challenges
currently confronting U.S. security policy pertaining to the South Asian region.
It was a major problem in most of the South Asian countries even before the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. There are plausible grounds for
thinking that this problem may have worsened in the nearly one year that has
passed since then. This problem presents itself today as a challenge to domestic
policy makers in most of the seven countries of South Asia; it presents itself
also as a challenge at the levels of regional and international security
policy.
To
examine the problem of religious radicalism in the South Asian region, the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies held a conference titled “Religion
& Security in South Asia” from 19 to 22 August 2002. The conference focused
on the three (3) largest countries of the region – India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh. The conference brought together senior policy makers, defense
officials, journalists, intelligence analysts, NGO activists, and leading
academics concerned with South Asia to discuss issues in connection with the
South Asian region’s religious radicalism. The specific objective was to
advance policymakers’ understanding of the relationship between religious
radicalism and security in this region, and thus to improve their capacity to
fashion security policies appropriate to the challenges of religious radicalism
in the present period. Thirty-eight (38) delegates representing six (6) nations
(Bangladesh, Denmark, India, Pakistan, Thailand, United States) participated in
this conference.
Among
the major conclusions of this conference:
- Religious radicalism is a growing security
threat in South Asia and adjoining regions. From its position only
a few years ago on the margins of policymaker concerns about the region,
religious radicalism has emerged in more recent years as a major issue on both
domestic (intra-regional) and foreign (extra-regional) policy agendas.
None of the governments in the three countries assessed appear in any
immediate danger of being ousted by radicalized religious forces.
Nevertheless, these forces command considerable organizational strength
and other assets, especially in Pakistan and India; and their ability to
exert influence in all three of these societies – via street power, for
instance, and through violent activity – should not be underestimated.
- Religious radicalism is not equally threatening
in the three countries assessed (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), but even
where it is weakest (Bangladesh) its organizational and ideological
potential is mounting. In part because of the strength of Bengali
ethnic nationalism, Bangladesh has a reputation in the region for
religious moderation. The reputation is somewhat deserved. Nevertheless,
persuasive evidence is growing of increased attacks on the Hindu minority
there as well as of the expansion of militant training camps in some parts
of the country. Especially in rural areas of Bangladesh, increased
socio-economic distress, mixed with the rapid spread of militant religious
ideological messages to both urban and rural populations, threatens to
erode the older reputation for moderation.
- Religious radicalism is not confined to the two
Muslim-majority countries assessed (Pakistan, Bangladesh) or to radical
Islamic movements; it is a major problem in Hindu-majority India and
includes radical Hindu movements. In Pakistan and Bangladesh,
religious radicals are largely, albeit not wholly, anti-government in
motivation. The case can be made fairly persuasively that in India, with
the electoral success in recent years of the ruling Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), that Hindu radical groups -- such as the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) – have
been brought into positions, if not of actual ruling authority, then at
least of greatly increased ability to influence government policy. It is
equally true, of course, that governments in Bangladesh and Pakistan have
not been averse to the exploitation of religious radicalism in pursuit of
their own (generally secular) agendas. In South Asia, in other words, we
are confronted with more than one (Islamic) form of religious radicalism
and with complicated relationships between government and the forces of
religious radicalism.
- Religion as such (as a body of beliefs or
doctrine) has little to do with what goes by the label of religious
radicalism in these three countries; rather, religious identity is much
more often simply the vehicle rather than the inspiration
for religious radicalism. It is nowadays conventional to speak of
“religious radicalism,” without much thought of what the bond between
these two words actually amounts to. Clearly, religious identity is
routinely invoked in efforts to mobilize South Asian populations – in all
three countries – behind one or another political movement. Those who do
the mobilizing, including government bodies in all three countries, appear
to be motivated themselves by secular political objectives, not by
anything having to do with religious belief or doctrine. It is often
misleading, in other words, to speak of religious radicalism, since doing
so almost inevitably implicates the religion itself rather than those who
cynically exploit its natural mobilizing power..
- The religious madrassahs (Islamic
religious schools or seminaries) that are today found in very large
numbers in all three of these countries do play an important role in
relation to religious radicalism. If nothing more, they at least serve as
reservoirs or pools for recruitment to radical and violent organizations.
However, the assertions heard in some quarters that the madrassahs
are “factories of jehad” – incubators, in effect, of religion-based
terrorism and violence – probably overstate their importance. The madrassahs are
unquestionably spreading in number in all three countries assessed; and,
somewhat surprisingly, most rapidly of all in Bangladesh. The overwhelming
majority of them appear in all three countries to have very little to do
with active jehadist (militant, violent) activities; and, indeed, often
service the socio-economic needs of the rural poor. The relationship
between these madrassahs and the mounting violence and terrorist
activity in these countries is more often asserted than proven.
- Inter-communal and sectarian violence is
mounting significantly in all three countries assessed – and in rural as
well as in urban settings. Pakistan has experienced substantial
growth in Sunni-Shia sectarian violence in recent years. In Bangladesh,
there are increasing reports of Muslim-Hindu violence – with Hindu
outmigration from Bangladesh inevitably following. Hindu-Muslim communal
riots have exploded this past year in the Indian state of Gujarat; and
these riots, at least in terms of the atrocities committed, rank among the
worst in Indian history. What is most worrisome in all three countries,
perhaps, is that in most instances government complicity with the rioters
(whether at the central or local levels) seems to be present.
- Religious radicalism is growing in strength and
importance in both Kashmir and in Northeast India, the two regions in
which religious radicalism’s connection with ethnic separatism was
assessed. Its growth is apparent not only among Muslim populations but
also among Hindus. Islamic radicalism’s reach into the
Indian-controlled section of Kashmir has been apparent for some years. It
has been a major factor impeding settlement of the Kashmir dispute between
India and Pakistan. Religious radicalism, at least as a significant
political force, is a newer phenomenon in India’s Northeast. Both Islamic
and Hindu radical forces seem to have gained ground there in the recent
past. The Northeast’s ethnic and religious complexity, mixed with its
economic backwardness and miserable record of governance, make for an
especially combustible political mix.
- The “global war against terrorism” (GWAT) has
contributed to the growth of religious radicalism in these three countries
and, specifically and most obviously, to the sharp decline in
India-Pakistan relations. Inadvertently, the GWAT has exacerbated
political tensions within all three countries; and, in all three of them
has fed recruitment to religious radical organizations. The GWAT also
intensified the existing animosity between India and Pakistan, helping to
bring on the massive mobilization of forces on their common border that
began in late 2001 and continues today.
- Religious radicalism is associated in all three
countries assessed with a deterioration in democratic governance and
increased threats both to minority group and individual human rights.
Governments in all three countries assessed have seized upon the threat
from religious radicalism as an opportunity to consolidate power, attack
and undermine political oppositions, and to erode existing civil
liberties. Minority group rights and individual human rights are presently
threatened with severe erosion by virtue of political and legal actions
undertaken by the governments in these three countries ostensibly to curb
religious radicalism and terrorism.
- International, and especially U.S. security
policy responses to religious radicalism in the three countries assessed
should not be focused too narrowly on the specific threat of terrorism
arising from religious radicalism. It needs to focus much more extensively
and imaginatively on the political and economic circumstances in these
countries – the problem of bad governance perhaps foremost among them -- that breed radicalism. Religious
fanaticism may help to breed religious radicalism, violence and terrorism.
More likely than not, however, the principal breeding grounds for
religious radicalism are socio-economic and political in nature, having
mainly to do with the rise of discontent and alienation associated with
widespread poverty, under- and unemployment, as well as (and not least)
political corruption and ineffective government. Single-minded dedication
to counter-terrorist strategies, while perhaps understandable, runs the
risk of missing the most important sources of radical ideology and
activity.
- Finally, the United States and international
organizations need to link their economic assistance to countries in South
Asia with insistence upon regional governments’ improvement in the social
sector, respect for human and minority rights, and the enhanced quality of
mass education. International (including U.S.) aid programs should
include conditions requiring recipient governments in the region, in
return for aid given, to demonstrate increased dedication to improvements
in the social sector, protection of human and minority rights, and
especially in regard to the quality of mass education. Over the longer
term, these are the sectors where more enlightened government efforts will
pay huge dividends in the curbing of religious radicalism and the violence
associated with it.